After the Jordanian parliamentary elections… a crossroads

The parliamentary elections that were recently held in Jordan raised hopes and fears at the same time.

In terms of hopes, there is a great comparison to the elections that took place in 1989 (the elections for the eleventh House of Representatives), which Jordanians considered a true model of integrity and credibility. Jordan has not witnessed a similar turn or transformation in the political scene since then. Rather, there were steps backwards from the “decision-making kitchen,” a change in the electoral law, and a confrontation with the political opposition, which marked the entire following period, until the elections of September 10 of this year came, after the approval of electoral and party legislation that was considered progressive, and brought about important transformations in terms of policies, and fundamental

transformations in terms of the party scene.

A noticeable political and party activity has emerged for two years, and it ended with elections that were described as having a high degree of integrity and credibility. There was not one surprise, but two surprises (or shocks) for the official and unofficial institutions. The first was the great result of the Islamic Action Front Party, obtaining 17 seats out of 41 seats (with a third of the votes of those who voted on the national party list), and 14 seats on the local lists – governorates. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood obtained 31 seats out of 138 seats in the House of Representatives, a number that in principle does not exceed the logic of a limited minority, and does not affect the current balances in the political equation within the political system, but it is an important and significant number on the level of the balance of power in the street, and in framing the size of the Islamists in it. In contrast to (the second shock), the inability of the main political parties, which were bet on by state institutions, such as the National Charter, Irada, Islamic National Party, and Progress parties, to compete with the Brotherhood, and the very limited representation at the level of the national party list (some of these parties announced that they had won a large number of seats, which they obtained through the local lists in which their members ran in the elections, but not under the banner of these parties and their slogans).

The gap between the actual figures and the poll figures was large, which created an element of surprise in the results of the Jordanian elections.

All the opinion polls, announced and unannounced, on which the decision-making centers based their reading of the scene and expectations failed, so the gap between the actual figures and the poll figures was large, which created an element of great surprise in the results, which prompted many politicians, inside and outside the decision-making corridors, to take the initiative to emphasize the error of the idea of ​​political modernization, and the major mistakes (according to them) that the Committee for Modernizing the Political System made, especially with regard to the national party list at the level of the House of Representatives, or the push towards increasing the number of party seats during the next stage (as the election law stipulated half the number of seats in the next council, reaching the majority in a third stage).

Now, there is a trend among political elites calling for a retreat from this path and warning of its consequences, whether by demanding the reopening of the electoral law and the withdrawal of the national party list or making it open and not closed, or shifting the idea of ​​political parties towards local constituencies rather than national ones, under the pretext that the Islamists’ voting power was not in local constituencies, but in the national list, as they obtained more than double what they obtained in the national list.

In fact, many conservative politicians today go to interpret the text, which talks about increasing the number of party seats in the House of Representatives, as it does not (necessarily) mean the national party list, but rather that this could happen through the governorate seats, because taking other seats from the governorates in the 2028 elections would be playing with fire and tampering with social, cultural and political stability.

Based on these discussions, we can understand how the elections that took place two weeks ago also raise concerns more than they raise hopes, as the conservative trend found in the results an opportunity to increase the level of fear of the rising power of the Islamists, and the chaos that is happening, and to call for taking steps backwards and reviewing the entire path of modernization.

On the other hand, all political forces seem to be in a state of astonishment after the Islamists’ result, and the failure of the leftist parties with their various trends (ideological and programmatic – centrist) to achieve any result in the elections, and not reaching the electoral threshold. All of this made not only the conservative trend an opponent of the Islamists, but perhaps other trends, which began timid calls to review the electoral law and change direction.

The Jordanian political scene today, after the parliamentary elections, seems to be at a crossroads; perhaps the expected scenario is to move forward according to the planned path, while working to limit the power of the Islamists, reviewing the party experience, identifying the reasons that led to the weakness of the “loyalty parties”, and working to correct the situation, then a tactical, not official, retreat from many of the ideas that shaped the trends in the next stage, including rethinking the election law and reviewing the next stages, and how to deal with the street and the opposition, and perhaps if the differences explode within the House of Representatives, and between the Islamists and the governments, and move to the street, this will reinforce the path of retreat to a more obvious degree from the currently proposed modernization path.

The differences within the House of Representatives and between the Islamists and the governments, and their transfer to the street, may reinforce the path of retreat from the modernization path

What are the variables and factors that will control the delineation of which path will succeed in the next stage? …

including the parliamentary movement and the extent of the success of the idea of ​​building a majority coalition of political parties to confront an Islamic minority, including what is related to the movement in the street and its interaction with many of the political demands of the opposition, including what is related to the regional situation and the upcoming American elections, and including what is related to the ability and intelligence of the political opposition to pass the stage and present moderate messages that do not reinforce the arguments of the current that is afraid of the modernization process.

It seems as if many politicians and officials are very concerned about the election results, as if we are entering the next stage with our backs out the door, and we are looking back (the previous stage), as if it is not normal for there to be a surprising result in favor of the opposition, as happened in France and Britain in the last elections.

In general, the success of the democratic experiment in Jordan, and not falling into the trap of historical stereotypes (taking one step forward and two steps back), lies, according to all models and theories of democratic transformation, in the ability to reach a deal between the open wing in the state and the moderate current in the opposition, and rationalizing the discourses, interests and demands between all parties, and moving forward with calm, gradual steps. Otherwise, the scenario will be a tactical return to the past, which implies a clear strategic choice to close the door to democratic transition, which was opened with the Committee for Modernizing the Political System.