A Second Trump Presidency: Implications for Israel-Palestine, Iran, and Arab-Israeli Normalization
With the Middle East in a period of significant conflicts, the world carefully awaits to see what course the United States’s foreign policy in the region will take after the American elections on November 5th. Despite Kamala Harris’ surge in popularity since replacing Joe Biden as the Democratic Party’s candidate, many still consider a return of Donald Trump to the White House more likely. How would a second Trump Presidency approach the Middle East, and what are the important questions his administration would have to face? This article takes a deeper look at Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy by examining his stance on the issues of Israel-Palestine, Iran-US relations, and Arab-Israeli Normalization.
Israel-Palestine: Does Trump Have a Path to Peace?
While Trump’s support for Israel is unequivocal, there are still several questions as to how he would approach the current Israel-Palestine conflict if re-elected. Trump has previously claimed to be the “best friend that Israel has ever had”, referring to his unprecedented decisions in favor of Israel.[1] During his last administration, he unpromptedly moved the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, recognized the annexed Golan Heights as part of Israeli territory, and put forward “Peace to Prosperity”, better known as “The Deal of the Century” and considered to be more favorable towards Israel than any previous peace plan.[2] Following the selection of the staunch Israel-supporter JD Vance as his vice-presidential candidate, Trump’s second term is expected to be no less pro-Israel.
So far in his 2024 campaign, Trump has criticized Biden’s handling of the War in Gaza, even going as far as calling him a “very bad Palestinian” during their first debate.[3] Nevertheless, according to American foreign policy expert Professor Gregory Gause, the difference between Biden and Trump on Israel-Palestine is in rhetoric, not practical policy.[4] There is no political cost for Trump to wholeheartedly back Netanyahu’s government as his party is “anchored in the least questioning element of American support for Israel”, while the Biden-Harris administration risks alienating key segments of their voting base if they refrain from criticizing Israel’s escalation of the war. Even so, President Biden continues to support Israel militarily and economically, demonstrating a hesitance to impose significant pressure on Netanyahu.
Even though Trump’s practical approach to Israel appears to align with the current Biden-Harris Administration, the former president seems convinced that if he were to serve a second term, Israel would end its war and peace would be achieved. [5] However, how Trump would accomplish this remains uncertain. On the one hand, both Trump and JD Vance have been reiterating the importance of providing Israel with all the support they need to “finish the job”[6] [7], but, on the other hand, Trump has criticized Israel for losing international standing and called for both sides to “get back to peace and stop killing people”.[8] Thus, a fundamental question arises: will Trump take decisive action to bring Netanyahu into serious peace negotiations or will he allow Israel to continue their warfare with even less interference and criticism than the Biden administration? Neither Trump nor his campaign has provided any substantial detail on how the US would help Israel “finish the job”, nor on how such an effort is reconcilable with a stable post-war Gaza and a two-state solution. Ultimately, according to former US ambassador to Syria and Israel Edward Djerejian, the best indicator of whether Trump will succeed in ending a war that is detrimental to the US’s goal of stability in the region will be his ability to push back on Netanyahu and not “conflate U.S. national security interests with Israel’s perceived national security interests”. [9] The image of Trump as a peacemaker and an assertive leader in foreign policy will depend on his ability to leverage the US’s geopolitical position over Israel to dissuade the country from dragging on a war that is at odds with U.S. strategy. [10]
Iran: The Root of All Evil?
While Trump is evasive about how he would handle the Israel-Palestine conflict, his policy towards Iran appears to be set in stone. According to Professor Gause, the biggest difference between the current Biden Administration and a potential second Trump administration would be the approach to sanctions on Iran.[11] While Trump famously withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Biden’s administration was reportedly attempting to restart diplomatic talks on a new nuclear deal.[12] If Trump is reelected, we will likely see a return to a tactic labeled by his administration as “maximum pressure” on Iran. In fact, Project 2025, a program described by the Washington Post as “the most detailed articulation of what Trump might do in a second term”, calls for doubling down the sanctions on Iran and supporting Iranian anti-government movements to be top policy priorities in the Middle East if Trump wins the election.[13] [14]
The hawkish approach to Iran is anchored on the strongly held belief within Trump’s circle that the country is the true source of all turmoil in the region. As claimed by his former national security advisor Robert C. O’Brien, “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be solved until Iran is contained”.[15] However, Ambassador Djerejian questions this analysis; it is in fact “a resolution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that takes the wind out of the sails of the axis of resistance”, not the other way around. [16] According to Djerejian, Trump and his advisors fail to see that Israel’s borders would be more secure in a situation where Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militias are no longer galvanized by the plight of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, he points out that it would go against Trump’s usual approach to fully rule out improved relations with Iran, given his transactional and opportunistic diplomatic style. However, despite Trump’s history of meeting with traditional US adversaries, any rapprochement with Iran in a second presidency remains highly unlikely, even as the newly elected reformist president Masoud Pezeshkian has expressed faint hopes of harmonization with the West.[17]
Beyond the Abraham Accords: Obstacles to Further Normalization
Another leading priority for a second Trump administration would be to further normalization between Israel and surrounding Arab states. The 2020 Abraham Accords, through which Israel established diplomatic relations with Arab countries for the first time since 1994, are by many considered to be Trump’s greatest diplomatic achievement in the Middle East during his last term. The Accords came as a result of Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor Jared Kushner’s innovative corporate-style approach to shuttle diplomacy and became an ultimate attestation of the Trump administration’s opportunistic and transactional foreign policy. The deal was praised by its signatories as being a great step towards peace in the region, and supporters point to the Biden administration’s attempt to build on the accords as a testament to its success. However, critics such as Ambassador Djerejian, have disparaged the accords for bypassing the underlying Palestine issue, arguing how the recent war in Gaza is proof that there can be no lasting peace in the region without a political solution to the conflict between Israel and Palestine.[18]
The next country to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel was expected to be Saudi Arabia. In the fall of 2023, US diplomats were reportedly very close to finalizing a trilateral deal where Saudi Arabia would obtain a formal US defense treaty with guaranteed security commitments in return for normalization with Israel, who would have to agree on a commitment to a two-state solution, even without any serious plan of implementation. [19] However, the aftermath of the October 7th attack put an immediate halt to the negotiations.
If Trump was reelected, he would likely be interested in re-facilitating talks between the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Yet, there exist two major obstacles to materializing such a deal. Firstly, as stated by Ambassador Djerejian, “the price of normalization has become a lot higher”.[20] In fact, in an interview with CNN back in January 2024, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister said there can be no normalization with Israel without a serious path to a Palestinian state. [21] As of now, any concessions by Israel seem impossible, especially considering the current far-right government. Yet, even if Trump were to achieve the necessary concessions by Israel or go on to negotiate a bilateral deal with Saudi Arabia to move the country further from China’s sphere of influence, Professor Gause points out that Trump would likely face a second challenge domestically as a US defense treaty requires ratification by two-thirds of the Senate. Before October 7th, President Biden saw a golden opportunity to move forward with the deal.[22] He estimated that he had enough votes from Republican lawmakers and that Democrats concerned about the US building closer ties with Saudi Arabia would stay loyal to their president and support ratification. Trump is unlikely to have the same bipartisan support as the opposition from Democratic lawmakers will only grow stronger, fueled by their desire not to give him a victory on the foreign policy front. As a result, a limited bilateral deal with Saudi Arabia, similar to the security cooperation agreement with Bahrain, is much more likely.[23]
Conclusion: Does a Trump Doctrine Exist?
If there is anything that stands out from examining Trump’s Middle East policy, it is Trump’s high level of unpredictability. In one instance he acts opportunistic and pragmatic, but in another, his position appears steadfast. In an article published in Foreign Affairs, his former national security advisor O’Brien described the president as adhering “not to dogma, but to his own instincts”. [24] As a businessman, his views on bilateral relations are transactional and every meeting is a chance for a deal. In the diplomatic world, such opportunism is generally viewed negatively as it may bypass traditional confidence-building measures among states, yet many argue that it was the reason behind the Abraham Accords and other foreign policy successes. Trump claimed this approach made him a peacemaker in the Middle East, pointing to the Abraham Accords, the withdrawal of most American troops from Syria after the declaration of defeating ISIS. At the same time, he refrained from military engagement after oil installations in Abqaiq Khurais, Saudi Arabia, were attacked in 2019..[25] [26]
However, Trump’s foreign policy in the region cannot be clearly categorized as fully isolationist; in fact, his opportunism and unpredictable approaches lead to several paradoxes. For instance, he constantly emphasizes putting “America first” and criticizes the country’s engagement in “forever wars”, yet he expresses unconditional military support for Israel in its protracted conflict with Palestine. Furthermore, while he is open to dealing with non-democratic leaders, he excludes all possibilities of bettering relations with Iran.[27] Thus, Trump’s Middle East Policy could generally be described as pragmatic and opportunistic, but his steadfast stance as pro-Israel and anti-Iran shows that there are certain limits to this analysis. As Professor Gause describes, on any particular issue Trump “could probably wake up and change his mind tomorrow”. [28] The only true dogma that Trump adheres to is his unpredictability.
[1] C-SPAN Agency, “Former President Trump Speaks at Republican Jewish Coalition” link: https://www.c-span.org/video/?524302-10/president-trump-speaks-republican-jewish-coalition
[2] Trump White House Website, “Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People”, January – 2020, link: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/peacetoprosperity/
[3] CNN Agency, “READ: Biden-Trump debate transcript”, 28-1-2024, link: https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/27/politics/read-biden-trump-debate-rush-transcript/index.html
[4] An interview made by the author with Professor Gregory Gause on 17.07.2024
[5] Ravid, Barak, “Trump posts letter from Palestinian leader ahead of Netanyahu meeting”, 23-7-2024, link: https://www.axios.com/2024/07/24/trump-palestinian-leader-letter-netanyahu-meeting-peace
[6] Lucenete, Adam, “Meet J.D. Vance, Trump’s VP pick: Hawk on Israel, a critic of foreign aid”, 15-7-2024, link: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/07/meet-jd-vance-trumps-vp-pick-hawk-israel-critic-foreign-aid
[7] CNN Agency, “READ: Biden-Trump debate transcript”, 28-7-2024, link: https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/27/politics/read-biden-trump-debate-rush-transcript/index.html
[8] Colvin, Jill, “Trump says Israel has to get war in Gaza over ‘fast’ and warns it is ‘losing the PR war’”, 5-4-2024, link: https://apnews.com/article/trump-biden-israel-pr-hugh-hewitt-21faee332d95fec99652c112fbdcd35d#
[9] An interview made by the author with Ambassador Edward Djerejian on 30.07.2024.
[10] Trump’s supporters claim that the stability during his rule came through his ability to be perceived as strong and respected by both allies and opponents. In a speech to the UN in 2020, Trump himself claimed to be fulfilling the US destiny as a peacemaker by adhering to the Roman principle of “Peace through strength”.
[11] An interview made by the author with Professor Gregory Gause on 17.07.2024
[12] The New York Times Newspaper, “Biden Administration Formally Offers to Restart Nuclear Talks With Iran”, 12-9-2021, link: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/18/us/politics/biden-iran-nuclear.html
[13] The Washington Post Newspaper, “What Project 2025 is and the biggest changes it proposes”, 12-7-2024, link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/07/12/project-2025-summary-trump/
[14] Skinner, Kiron, “Department of State”, in “Project 2025”, link: https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-06.pdf
[15] O’Brien, Robert, ”The Return of Peace Through Strength”, July – 2024, Foreign Affairs Magazine, Link: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/return-peace-strength-trump-obrien
[16] An Interview Made by the Author with Ambassador Edward Djerejian on 30.07.2024.
[17] Wintour, Patrick, “Iran’s new president rekindles faint hopes of rapprochement with west”, The Gurdian Agency, 28-7-2024, link: https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/28/iran-new-president-masoud-pezeshkian-rekindles-feint-hopes-of-rapprochement-with-west
[18] An interview made by the author with Ambassador Edward Djerejian on 30.07.2024.
[19] UN News, “Israel on the cusp of historic peace with Saudi Arabia, Netanyahu announces at UN”, 22-9-2023, link: https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/09/1141302
[20] An interview made by the author with Ambassador Edward Djerejian on 30.07.2024
[21] Reuters, “Saudi’s foreign minister: No normal Israel ties without path to Palestinian state“, 21-1-2024, link: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudis-foreign-minister-no-normal-israel-ties-without-path-palestinian-state-cnn-2024-01-21/
[22] An interview made by the author with Professor Gregory Gause on 17.07.2024
[23] Media Note by US Department of State, “Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement”, 13-9-2023, link: https://www.state.gov/comprehensive-security-integration-and-prosperity-agreement/
[24] O’Brien, Robert, ibid.
[25] Barnes, J., and Schmitt, E, “Trump Orders Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Northern Syria”, 13-10-2019, link: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/us/politics/mark-esper-syria-kurds-turkey.html
[26] Holland, S., and El Gamal, R., “Trump says he does not want war after attack on Saudi oil facilities”, Reuters Agency, 17-10-2019, link: https://www.reuters.com/article/world/trump-says-he-does-not-want-war-after-attack-on-saudi-oil-facilities-idUSKBN1W10X6/
[27] Campisi, Jessica, “Trump called out for ‘my favorite dictator’ while awaiting Egyptian leader at summit: report”, 13-9-2019, link: https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/461375-trump-called-out-for-my-favorite-dictator-while-awaiting-egyptian/
[28] An interview made by the author with Professor Gregory Gause on 17.07.2024