Jordanian Diplomacy and the War on Gaza Amid Shifting Dynamics
“The article is published in JPS Magazine”
The war on Gaza between Israel and Palestinian resistance groups mainly Hamas since October 2023 has seriously threaten Jordan’s national interests as well as relations with Israel in ways not seen at least since 1994 when Amman and Tel Aviv signed their peace treaty. Prior to October 7th relations between both countries witnessed ups and downs and were tense in particular with successive Israeli governments led by Netanyahu and his far rights partners. Jordan, led by his majesty King Abdullah II, has consistently warned in recent years of the potential explosion in the Palestinian territories because of the absence of peace, and systematic Israeli suppressive and oppressive measures against Palestinians. However, Jordan a country that believes firmly in peace has relentlessly attempted along with the concerned regional and international parties to create conducive conditions that could lead to a meaningful peace process between Palestinians and Israelis as seen in the Aqaba and Sharm El-Sheikh summits prior to the eruption of the Gaza War.
Jordan’s Early Prediction of the Current Escalation and its Position.
Jordan had foresaw the Gaza event before it happened on October 7th. The warnings and statements made by his majesty the King consistently cautioned against the potential consequences. Weeks before the eruption of the War in a speech delivered by the King during the UN General assembly annual meetings in September 2023 he clearly warned and anticipated that the deteriorating situation in the Palestinian territories under the Israeli occupation would result in a vicious cycle of violence. This visionary outlook reflects a deep Jordanian understanding of the different dynamics of the Palestinian issue. One could easily claim that Amman is the closest party to this issue and the one that understands it better. Jordan has always sought to understand and predict Israeli behavior and has demonstrated a high capability in doing so.
Due to this foresight, Jordan’s strategy from the very beginning anticipated that Israel’s war against Gaza would be prolonged. Therefore, Jordan has took a sharp and firm position against what Tel Aviv is doing in Gaza, advocated for the protection of Palestinian civilians in the Strip, sent humanitarian aid , sought immediate permanent ceasefire and to create a meaningful path for the resumption of peace talks on the bases of two states solution. Moreover, the specter of forced displacement of Palestinians from their land by the far-right Israeli government and the possibility of a second Nakba were very real concerns.
Since October 2023 Jordan has followed a very active approach to foreign policy where the King invested huge diplomatic efforts towards important regional and foreign capitals and their leaders particularly concerned Arab parties, Western leaders and most importantly US President Joe Biden whom he met at the White House after October 7. Since the eruption of the war, Jordan has actively and effectively participated in every regional and international conference, summit and diplomatic encounters to mobilize support for Amman’s position, ending the war and find a pathway for peace. Actually the King was among the first international leaders to label Israel’s inhuman actions in the Gaza Strip as “war crimes”. Moreover, Jordan was the first country to airdrop aid to Gaza and Amman has become a major hub for joint air operations for the delivery of additional aid.
Although, Jordan has navigated safely numerous issues and challenges in the past, the events of October 7th were distinct in terms of timing, the scale of the catastrophe, and the reactions from the Jordanian public and political forces. This combination has exerted significant pressure on Jordan. The developments over the past seven months, which have altered the reality of the Palestinian issue and generated multiple security as well as political challenges compelled Jordan to respond.
Raising the Bar of State Rhetoric Escalated the Bar of Aspirations.
Many believes that the state hawkish stance concerning the war and Israel, has raised high expectations from the public and created the impression that Amman on a serious collision course with Tel Aviv. Certainly, the Palestinian issue is one of the most important concerns for Jordan. However, from my perspective Jordan is a country known to be a rational actor, it cannot present itself as a single-issue country while ignoring the complexity of its different national interests. The conflict is not limited to the Palestinians and Israelis only, it is a complex regional and international conflict of a multiparty nature. Consequently, it is not an issue that one party can manage on its own. Therefore, probably this necessitates that Jordan’s official position be characterized by greater rationality and logic. In its well-balanced policy, Jordan should avoid raising expectations by giving the impression that it can do everything.
On the international arena level, the war on Gaza has clearly exposed the complexities of the Palestinian issue in global politics, highlighting double standards and the American monopoly of the peace process, as well as fragmented Palestinian domestic politics, Israeli troubled domestic politics and the inter-Arab disintegrated politics, all present a serious dilemma to Jordan.
Certainly, the elevated tone of the official discourse is due to the Israeli brutal war on Gaza and to the Jordanian public protests and reactions which has created pressure on the government. However, one could suggest that the above-mentioned structural limitations dictates that Amman should reconsider its position and instead maintain a balancing act policies characterized by pragmatism and rationality so as to safeguard its national interests. Interests that are linked to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, strategic partnership with US and the West, and with its key Arab strategic partners.
Jordan and the “Hamas Question”
Since the ousting of the movement from in 1999, relations between Hamas and Amman remained inactive and characterized with coldness, however, back door channels remained opened. However, the eruption of the War on Gaza triggered questions about viability and necessity of resuming relations between both parties. Nevertheless, nothing serious has changed in their bilateral relations. Yet, after eight months of military confrontation that generated unprecedented destruction and loss of life in the Strip both parties particularly Hamas is facing a serious dilemma. There is an increasing belief among many parties at the regional and international level that Hamas rule in Gaza should end and the Palestinian National Authority in Ramallah should govern the Strip. Under such political and military pressure, one would suggest that Hamas is currently in a predicament as it realizes that matters in Gaza have changed dramatically and they will not be the same as before 7 October, whether in terms of governance or its popularity in the Strip. Some reports have suggested that the prospects of losing its governance and influence in Gaza, the movement is looking for alternative arenas where it can establish a foot hold, like in Jordan for instance.
The movement believes that it enjoys a great sympathy among the Jordanian public. Moreover, there exists an ideological and organizational link between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan which could be used for the benefit of Hamas and therefore, it is in the interest of the movement, as well as the interest of its supporters, to have a presence there. This makes Jordan, in other words, the most suitable arena for challenging Israel.
The abovementioned scenario, which is from my perspective seem impossible, has been validated by provocative statements and rhetoric made by some Hamas leaders encouraging Jordanians to intensify their public protests and even to cross the borders into Palestine. This was met with strong rejection and condemnation by the Jordanian government, besides great segments of the Jordanians as well as many social and political groups.
Although Jordan tacitly recognizes the movement as part of the Palestinian political and religious groups, one would not anticipate any profound change in the relation between Amman and Hamas. Therefore, Jordan’s position towards the movement in the future is subject to Amman’s national interests and political changes within the domestic Palestinian politics as well as how far Hamas would change pragmatically. I believe that even if Hamas was to survive the current War with Israel, it would emerge with deep injuries and week. Therefore, the movement’s options are very limited either to become political pragmatic group, dismantle its military wing and join PLO which Amman has recognized officially since 1974 or go underground and continue its military resistance.
Jordan’s Possible Options Amid Current Transformations
The current Gaza War and its ramifications raises many questions and speculations about a range of issues in relation to Amman’s national interest, such as the relationship with the United States and who would be the next American president. relationship with Israel amidst the existing political tension with Jordan, alongside certain ongoing regional developments, such as the Arab-Israeli normalization efforts.
Despite uneasy relations with Israel, the United States full-fledged support for Tel Aviv, and the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the White House leadership, Amman’s relationship with the United States is inherently strategic. Jordan as a rational actor where its behavior has been determined by its geopolitical rational, including its national interests, does not have the luxury to abandon this long standing strategic relationship with the US. The latter is probably the most important country in the web of Jordan’s vast regional and international relations. Both countries have forged their historical and strategic relations on the bases of their mutual interests where the US is considering Jordan as one of its trusted partners and allies. Speaking of the Palestinian issue including current Gaza War, it is arguably true that one of the factors in Jordan’s management of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the historical strategic relationship with the United States who has been playing a dominant role in the conflict as well as peace efforts to solve it. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that Jordan’s relations with the US can be described as deeply rooted and it stands on firm ground that transcends the ups and downs as well as different dynamics of the American domestic politics. Therefore, we must take the Jordanian-American relationship in its overall context, and thus the issue of a strategic confrontation in the event of Donald Trump’s return is unlikely. Jordan has experience in dealing with the United States, and it is not in Jordan’s interest at this time to move away from the US even if Trump was to be elected again. This view was observable during Trump’s first term where Jordan has tried to understand and accommodate Trump, as summarized by King Abdullah II in the saying, “We are in strategic relations with the United States, but we agreed that we differ on the Palestinian issue.” However, if Biden would be elected for a second term, which is highly likely, it is expected that we would witness further development and cooperation between the two countries over issues of common interest and intensifying of their peace efforts to find a meaningful path way to solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Jordan’s relationship with Israel, despite the complexity of the situation and the stubbornness of the Israeli side, it is not expected that there will be a strategic collision between them. Since 1994 both sides have continued to show interest in keeping their peace working despite some violations and provocative measures from the Israeli side particularly in Jerusalem Holy places where Amman has maintained custody over them. Many in Israel, including military and security establishments believes in the centrality and importance of Jordan to Palestinian question and the security of Tel Aviv. Moreover. taking into consideration the widely acknowledged belief that 7 October and its ramifications is going to shake up Israeli domestic politics, where one would expect to see the disappearance of Netanyahu from the political scene, to be replaced by a rational Israeli leader. Even if he was to survive the implications of this war, he will likely emerge with deep wounds and weak.
Jordan’s relations with the Arab countries particularly with Egypt and the Gulf States, these relations would continue to function within their strategic context and likely to be developed regardless of what sometimes appears that Amman may have some differences with these countries. The active and effective diplomacy that Jordan has been pursuing during the ongoing war in Gaza in close coordination with the concerned Arab parties, mainly Egypt and Gulf countries has confirmed and enhanced the centrality of Amman’s role in inter-Arab politics. Jordan, led his majesty King Abdullah II has attended and actively participated in every conference, summit and diplomatic encounters related to the Gaza War. Therefore, an overall assessment to Amman’s relations with these countries would suggest they are cordial and of a strategic nature especially with Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Palestinians.
It is noteworthy to suggest that this inter-Arab coordination provides legitimacy and support to Jordan’s stance even in dealing with the US and Israel. It is crucial to continue such active engagement with these relevant Arab countries.
October 7th has changed the political landscape of the region and imposed new equations on the concerned parties including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States. For instance, it impacted the trilateral strategic dialogue between Al-Riyadh, Washington. D.C and Tel Aviv prior to the war on Gaza that would a normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel in addition to bilateral Saudi-American issues, where Palestinians and Jordan were not part of the dialogue. The eruption of the war in Gaza has confirmed the fact that if peace and normalization were to be achieved one would need Palestinians and Jordan to be part of such a wider arrangement. This has already been seen in the form of the Sixth Arab committee that comprises Jordan. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and the Palestinians. This group has been engaging actively with the US in joint diplomatic efforts, in order to create favorable conditions to ending the war and starting a meaningful peace process. Today, the picture has become more comprehensive, and Jordan has a more prominent role. Gaza confirmed that there is no skipping over Jordan’s role, or the Palestinians, even in the stage of arranging the day after the war on Gaza. In the best caset scenarios, each party will understand the necessity of Jordan’s role to aid in achieving a settlement.
Is There a Need to Reconsider Jordan’s Hawkish ?Position Towards Israel
The centrality of the Palestinian Question within Jordan’s domestic politics as well as its foreign policy is not something new. Actually it is a given fact that resonates with Amman’s national interests and simply because of geographical, social as well as political proximity. As a rational actor and small state, Jordan’s behavior is governed by its geopolitical rational and the complexity of the Arab-Israel conflict including the Palestinian question. Jordan has been firmly advocating a peaceful solution on the basis of international legitimacy. Amman had Joined the larger Arab-Israel peace process in 1991 and eventually concluded peace treaty with Israel in October 1994. Since then the nature of their relations could suggested that their relations has witnessed fluctuation. However, an analysis of the history of this relationship one would easily claim that Jordan’s relations with Israel, particularly with governments headed by Netanyahu at least since 2011 were always tense. However, the War on Gaza and Israel’s systematic illegal practices, massive and deliberate killing of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank as well as unprecedented destruction of the Strip, has compelled Jordan to take a very hard and hawkish position against Tel Aviv. Actually relationship between both parties has never been this tense since 1994 the way they are now.
The Jordanian official position has resonated with the public one. Some even believe that the official position has transcended the public one. The King along with his aids and other officials have kept harshly criticizing what Israel is doing in the Strip and in the West Bank. Moreover, The Kingdome took certain diplomatic measures such as asking the Israel Ambassador to Jordan to leave the country. Furthermore, Amman went further when it considered the possibility of forced displacement of the Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan by Israel as a red line that would compel Amman to contemplate war with Tel Aviv.
As the war on Gaza has proceeded and the tone of the official Jordanian position has continued to be hawkish, this actually has created a covert as well as overt debate among political and intellectuals in Jordan. Some(conservatives) believe that from a realpolitik perspective, Jordan should reconsider its hard position and instead adapt a more rational position that takes into consideration its national interests and its structural limitations when it comes to influencing the pace of events on the Palestinian issue as well as relations with Israel. Jordan is not a super-regional power that can present itself as the one who can shoulder the burden of such a complex issue of a multiparty nature. Moreover, Jordan should not be perceived as a single issue country (that is the Palestinian issue). Rather Amman has many issues and challenges that are also impacting its national interests including the association with the Palestinians, challenges from its geographical neighborhood, relations and shared interests with its regional and international strategic partners. Addition this hard position is raising high expectations on the part of the public and eventually that the state would become a hostage to the public position, which is mostly emotionally driven. The state in reality cannot go on a serious collision course with Israel. It could jeopardize its interests including relations with US and other supporters of Israel. Therefore, Amman needs to recalibrate its position with fine tuning and constant care to safe guard its own concerns.
On the other hand, some within the Jordanian political and social elites strongly supports Amman’s hard position towards Israel. The unprecedented and savage war on Gaza is directly threatening Jordanian national interests and that Jordan has a moral, religious as well as political responsibilities towards the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Moreover, the proponents and advocates of Jordan’s hawkish stance argue that, in doing so Amman is defending itself from the Zionists ambitions of Netanyahu and his right wingers’ allies. Many radical figures within Israel have always advocated the notion of” Land of Israel” that includes Jordan.
One could argue that both camps are relatively right. This debate reveals the dilemma that Jordan has been facing since the eruption of the war that is impacting its domestic politics as well as its demographical make up.
This imposing a set of burdens on Jordan, the most important of which is the urgent need to strengthen and enhance the domestic front. To achieve this, the Jordanian state today needs to steer the public position in accordance with its national interests, and engage good, trusted politicians – politicians who possess the moral and ethical foundation that cannot be questioned. Moreover, there should be a balancing act between Jordan’s principles, moral and political responsibilities towards the Palestinians, and its own national interests the way other concerned parties are doing, like Egypt and the Gulf States.
Conclusion
It is widely acknowledged that the War on Gaza is a game changer to the international politics of the Middle East, mainly to different dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It brought back the Palestinian Question to the center stage of regional as well as international politics. Moreover, the War has generated multiple challenges to the region as well as direct threats to Jordan’s national interests. Therefore, Amman proactive diplomacy in response to this war emanates from its principles as well as its national strategic interests. Moreover, managing the war and eventually de-escalating it, and resolving the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict will remain Amman’s top priority goal.
After 8 months of war on Gaza, Jordan as a rational actor, should review its position regarding what happened, implications of the war, and debated ideas, scenarios and proposals by the concerned parties. It is essential to strive to understand Jordan’s role in post-Gaza, both at the regional and Palestinian contexts. Intensive efforts should be made to educate the Jordanian public that, Jordan as a state is defending its national interests including Palestinian question within the capacity of its power and structural limitations and does not officially present itself as an alternative to the Palestinians. Jordan must contribute significantly to strengthening official Palestinian structures PLO and PNA, and promote what is called the independence of the national palestinian institutions.
No one could deny the existence of special bonds between Jordan and Palestinians, but after the events of 1964, 1974, 1988, Oslo Accords, and other subsequent development , there is an official independent palestinian reality. Today, there are common ties, but with Jordan’s assertiveness in its stance, there is a fear of creating a perception that Jordan is a substitute for the Palestinian official structures and raising expectations. Evidence of this is seen in the raising of expectations by the Jordanian public, demanding more and more from Jordan.
Ultimately, there are strategic Jordanian interests that cannot be compromised like its national security and survivability, and the Jordanian state has fundamental principles that determine its position on this matter.
PS: The views and opinions expressed in the article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of PSI.