Oman Attack… Questions and Observations
The terrorist attack in Oman last week on a Shiite Mosque, which killed nine people including the three brothers who carried out the attack, raises several questions related to the incident, its context and implications, especially after the Islamic State (ISIS) organization announced its responsibility for the incident shortly after, and with the video showing the perpetrators pledging allegiance to the organization’s emir, Abu Hafs al-Hashemi.
Regarding the incident itself, the element of surprise came not from the size of the operation nor its strength, as it was limited in terms of the number of participants and the traditional method used, but because it took place in Oman, a country known for its remarkable success in containing extremism and violence culturally and socially, and building an approach that unites Ibadis with Sunnis and Shiites in environment that are not charged with sectarianism, unlike the situation in most Arab countries that include sects, ethnicities and religions.
Another paradox is that the records of the Al-Qaeda and Islamic State organizations, known in the media, and the international and regional reports that deal with the nationalities that make up these organizations are devoid of any Omani names, as if the state is immaculate concerning these groups, in addition to the absence of similar violent incidents. There is also the state of stability in the country since the so-called Dhofar Revolution (the Omani authorities announced coup attempts and carried out arrests of political and religious figures who were accused of attempting to overthrow the government and establish the Imamate system, and the late Sultan Qaboos pardoned them in 2005).
This work may be socially isolated, and it does not have significant social and cultural contexts, but it is, on the other hand, an indication of the existence of an outpost, which means that there is an urgent need to know the background of the three brothers and how the recruitment process took place, the social environment, and whether there was an impact of the war on Gaza on investment in this direction, or the strategic-diplomatic positioning of the Sultanate in regional positions, especially good relations with Iran, and not entering into neighboring conflicts and avoiding direct regional polarization operations.
In terms of regional implications, the occurrence of this operation in the Sultanate of Oman, the safe oasis, opens the door wide to expectations of a new and larger wave of violent reactions to the Israeli war on Gaza, but these reactions will take two main directions in the coming period: the first is linked to the traditional image of jihadist movements, since the rise of ISIS. The organization will work to invest in the angry feelings of a large percentage of Arab and Muslim youth, not only from the Western and American position that is generally complicit in the aggression, but also from the official Arab position that falls in the view of a large percentage of these youth within the framework of treason, conspiracy, weakness and collusion, and thus, taking the initiative to do something.
Although ISIS has lost its “state” and its model has suffered a devastating blow, it has not died, but rather continues and is very active in the Syrian desert, Afghanistan and Africa. Anyone who follows the organization’s media narrative will notice the insistence on continuing and surviving and the ability to reproduce the ideological discourse, as long as the conditions and contexts that produced this organization still exist and are even increasing and taking root in many countries and geographical regions.
The second aspect of armed action in the coming phase will take on a political character, meaning goals related to regional conflicts, and will be close to the line represented by the Sunni political Islam movements (linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, not Al-Qaeda or ISIS), which have not found an objective regional ally except the Iranian axis, despite the crisis and estrangement that the relationship between the two parties has gone through due to the Syrian revolution. However, it is clear that the strategic bets of Hamas, Iran and Hezbollah, the popular bases linked to these political goals, and the social bases angry about the aggression on Gaza, will all produce a new pattern of military-political action in the region, especially if regional affairs deteriorate and no deals or settlements are reached for the raging conflicts.
In conclusion, the unfolding and forthcoming events reflect the natural consequences of the dire situation in Gaza, the absence of a unified Arab front, and the lack of a central Arab entity to represent the Sunni Arabs in the geopolitical dynamics of the region since the collapse of the Baghdad Wall in 2003.
PS: The views and opinions expressed in the article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of PSI.