Regional Normalization of the al-Assad Regime into
Regional Normalization of the al-Assad Regime into 2022
Brian A. Bixler
Highlights:
– The Bashar al-Assad regime continues to successfully reignite social and economic foreign relations with regional actors entering 2022.
– There exists an opportunity for economic growth through enhanced economic policies and investments into a reestablishing Syrian nation despite Caesar Act sanctioning, but with detrimental long-term harm to regional democracy.
– The unprecedented disregard by the US for those who continue to normalize relations with al-Assad allows the future of Syria and of regional democracy to sit in the hands of Iran, Russia, China, and every nation of the Middle East.
Executive Summary:
In 2011, very few actors of the world believed the Syrian Government would survive the extensive Arab Spring uprising against the regime under President Bashar al-Assad. One decade and over 400,000 casualties later, the push for normalization of the Assad regime has never been more prevalent (Ogunnowo 2020: 1). What precedent will be created by normalization of such a uniquely oppressive power figure?
Nations that were former leaders of the regional opposition to the regime are now innovating ways to establish diplomatic and economic cooperation with it. Not only have Gulf countries and geographically closer EU countries begun to reopen embassies in Damascus, but the UAE has even sent their top foreign diplomat to discuss reconstruction efforts with Bashar al-Assad directly (Sherlock 2021). With a weak oppositional push from Washington under the Biden administration, and consistently strong support for regime stabilization by Iran, China, and Russia alike, the future of Syria is likely to extend the future of Assad (AFP 2021).
Despite this reality, regional powers should continue to retain a hardline policy ceiling with the reignited regime. A normalized regime under Bashar al-Assad will fashion the precedent, but a Syrian nation reconstructed under Assad’s supervision has the potential to develop a solidified threat to the future of security and democracy in the Middle East.
The Call for Humanitarian Rights Violations, 2011-2013
As the national uprising of the Arab Spring continued to intensify exponentially from 2011 to 2013 in Syria, oppressive measures by the Assad regime became overly combative with neglect for humanitarian rights and international law. Although al-Assad has never publicly admitted to being behind the chemical gas attacks outside of Damascus and other areas of Syria from 2013 through 2018, countless international investigations and a lack of cooperation from al-Assad have made it virtually conclusive that the regime had, on many occasions, weaponized deadly chemical weapons on the rebels and citizens of their nation (Zisser 2013: 64). As asserted by the former UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, “Any use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anybody, under any circumstances, would violate international law” (“Use of Chemical” 2013).
Despite a global push to charge Bashar al-Assad for human rights violations, the vetoes of Russia and China dissolved any chances of bringing the case to the International Criminal Court (Kaufman 2021: 288). Even today, the anti-West sentiment concentrated in the Syrian regime continues to draw strong support from Russia, China, and a geographically indispensable Iran. Nonetheless, member states of the Arab League successfully voted to suspend Syria from the regional organization indefinitely in an attempt to further suffocate the regime (Macfarquhar 2011). Quickly approaching 2022, external forces continue to reinforce the presidency of al-Assad, despite the fact that over 400,000 individuals have died, over 6 million have been displaced within Syria’s borders, and almost 7 million continue to seek safe refuge (Ogunnowo 2020: 1).
Regional Normalization — From Opposition to Cooperation
In 2011, the vote to suspend Syria from the Arab Spring passed with 18 out of 22 members supporting the suspension (Macfarquhar 2011). Along with Syria, various social and political ties to Syria at the time brought Lebanon and Yemen to vote against the suspension, while Iraq abstained (Macfarquhar 2011). However, the 18 other regional members saw disregard for international law and an overly oppressive response to civil uprising by the regime, and thus decided to cut ties through a suspension from the Arab League. Most of these nations decided to additionally close their respective embassies in Damascus (Macfarquhar 2011). Many western and European nations quickly followed.
Just over 10 years later, regional powers that once led the opposition movement to the Assad regime are now pushing support for normalization. As of November of 2021, the UAE had even sent their Foreign Minister, Abdullah bin Zayed, to innovate ways to cooperate with the regime in the future (Sherlock 2021). Only two days after this meeting, the UAE announced plans to construct a 300 megawatt solar farm outside of Damascus, solidifying their newfound cooperation with Assad (AFP 2021).
Joining the UAE, the nations of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and even the European nations of Greece and Hungary have fully reopened embassies in Damascus (Sherlock 2021). In addition, many European nations are becoming more enticed to adopt new, yet limited relations with Syria to begin restoring their influence and intelligence over the failed state (Sherlock 2021).
Unprecedented Disregard from the US — What does this mean for Syria?
Aimed at weakening the power of Assad as long as he retains his dictatorship, the United States established the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 to maneuver around the regime (APR 2021). A part of the sanctions imposed on the Assad regime through the Caesar Act advise nations to provide aid to Syrian citizens through vehicles that avoid contact with the Central Government in Damascus (APR 2021). Until now, nations that have opposed the regime have obeyed the guidelines of this act respectfully.
The recent diplomatic actions of the UAE have clearly overlooked the sanctions of the Caesar act, but the Biden administration has only slightly denounced the recent change in UAE-Syria relations (AFP 2021). With no legitimate soft power threat by the US against those who decide to normalize and strengthen foreign ties to Syria, the message becomes clear. If you want to disregard the sanctions of the Caesar Act, the US will not approve, but will equally not interfere.
The mute nature of the United States has become a green light for the nations of the Middle East to reignite their political and economic ties to Damascus with no repercussions, given they have lost their motivation to continue isolation of the Assad regime. The future of Syria greatly depends on whether the United States decides to strengthen its opposition towards Assad, or maintain a state of unprecedented disregard for normalization.
Conclusion:
Do renewed political and economic ties outweigh the cost of a precedent showing all sectarian dictators the true range of their executive power and ability to withstand opposition? Through US silence, this question is posed to each nation of the Middle East to decide for themselves. Many have already renewed relations, and few remain truly isolationist with their policy-making.
To what extent is limited power to the Assad regime even achievable when it is not a shared goal of the region anymore? Will a reintroduction to the Arab League mark an end to the opposition movement? It is likely that events within the next one to two years will provide the answers to these questions, provided that the weakened agenda of the Biden administration remains unchanged. As of now, the decisions of regional actors will steer Syria into the future and decide the range of sovereign power that will be returned to Bashar al-Assad.
Works Cited:
AFP. “Syria Inks Solar Plant Deal with UAE Firms.” Jordan Times, 13 Nov. 2021, https://www.jordantimes.com/news/business/syria-inks-solar-plant-deal-uae-firms.
AFP. “UAE Top Diplomat on First Syria Visit in over a Decade.” Jordan Times, 9 Nov. 2021, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/uae-top-diplomat-first-syria-visit-over-decade.
Kaufman, Sara, and Theodore David. “Int’l Humanitarian Law.” International Enforcement Law Reporter, vol. 37, no. 8, August 2021, p. 287-292. HeinOnline, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/ielr37&i=308.
Macfarquhar, Neil. “Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria over Crackdown.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 12 Nov. 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/world/middleeast/arab-league-votes-to-suspend-syria-over-its-crackdown-on-protesters.html.
Ogunnowo, Oluwaseyi Emmanuel, and Felix Chidozie. “International Law and Humanitarian Intervention in the Syrian Civil War: The Role of the United States.” SAGE Open 10.2 (2020): 2158244020919533.
Sherlock, Ruth. “Arab Nations That Opposed Assad’s Regime Have Begun Rebuilding Ties with Syria.” NPR, NPR, 14 July 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/06/23/1009582085/arab-nations-that-opposed-assads-regime-have-begun-rebuilding-ties-with-syria.
“Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria Would Be ‘Crime against Humanity’ – Ban.” United Nations, United Nations, 23 Aug. 2013, https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/08/447352-use-chemical-weapons-syria-would-be-crime-against-humanity-ban.
Zisser, Eyal. “Alone at the Top: Bashar al-Assad and the Struggle for Syria.” INSS Strategic Assessment (2013): 57-65.